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Abstract and Keywords
This essay seeks to understand the domain and demands of reparative justice in terms of
moral vulnerability. Significant harms raise the question of whether victims stand in truly
reciprocal practices of accountability; if they do, they enjoy the power of calling others to
account as well as bearing the liability of being accountable to others. In the aftermath of
harms, victims’ moral vulnerability is tested: they may be exposed to the insult and injury
of discovering that they do not enjoy the moral standing of holding others accountable.
While the occasion of reparative justice is significant wrongs and wrongful harms and
losses, this essay argues that the aim of reparative practices is not only or even primarily
to redress those harms and losses, but to address the moral vulnerability of victims by
affirming their status in accountability relations.
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Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
There is little philosophical agreement on the nature and aims of reparative
justice. I seek to understand the domain and demands of reparative justice in
terms of moral vulnerability. Significant harms raise the question of whether
victims stand in truly reciprocal practices of accountability; if they do, they enjoy
the power of calling others to account as well as bear the liability of being
accountable to others. In the aftermath of harms, victims’ moral vulnerability is
tested: they are exposed to the insult and injury of discovering that they do not
enjoy the moral standing of holding others accountable. While the occasion of
reparative justice is significant wrongs and wrongful harms and losses, the aim of
reparative practices, I argue, is not only or even primarily to redress those harms
and losses but to address the moral vulnerability of victims by affirming their
status in accountability relations. I draw some consequences from this view about
the obligations of communities and the communicative functions of reparations as
understood in recent political practice. This view also begins to explain how
varieties of reparative effort reflect variations in kind and degree of moral
vulnerability.
The idea of “making good” for a wrongful loss or injury by tendering to the victim
something of value, usually in a ritualized manner or in a symbolically scripted context, is
ancient and seemingly spans all cultures.1 There is yet little agreement, however, on the
nature and aims of reparative justice.2
(p.111) There is a strong association, and many consider it central or obvious, between
reparative justice and restitution or compensation through transfers of money or other
materially valuable goods. One paradigmatic practice is tort law and the central principle is
that of compensating persons injured by wrongful conduct to restore the antecedent
status of the wronged party or to provide equivalent or replacement value for damage to
her interests or well-being.3 The other historical referent attached directly to the term
reparations is the postwar punitive practice, between nations, of losers being compelled
to pay winners for the losses suffered in conflict—as in the familiar case of reparations
exacted from Germany by victorious nations after the First World War. In the later
twentieth century, however, a new practice of reparations has since been initiated by
nations, elaborated in the jurisprudence of international courts and embedded in United
Nations guidelines for combating impunity and making remedies and reparations available
to victims of grave human rights abuses.4 This new practice identifies individuals (and in
some instances where individuals are targeted collectively, groups) as the bearers of
rights to remedies and reparations from states for grave abuses of their human rights.
As a result, the very concept of reparations has shifted rapidly and dramatically from a
transaction between states to an obligation of states (and possibly by implication other
entities) to redress individuals or in some instances groups by means of diverse forms of
reparations that may include restitution or compensation but go beyond them.
Complexities of this new practice of reparations call for rethinking some familiar ideas of
reparative justice as restoring the status quo ante or compensating in proportion to
harm. I will argue that what is revealed in reparations movements and struggles is a
dimension of reparative justice that goes beneath the harms in question to still deeper
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Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
issues of moral relationship and a distinct kind of vulnerability to indignity that inheres in
it.
I claim that what is at stake most fundamentally in circumstances where reparations are at
issue—cases of mass violence, systemic abuse, or historical injustice—is whether those
wronged possess the standing to call to account those who have wronged them or who
bear responsibility for the repair of the wrongs they have suffered. To better
understand this dimension of reparative (p.112) justice, I introduce the concept of
moral vulnerability. By moral vulnerability, I mean a vulnerability that inheres in our
assumption that we possess a certain moral status as full participants in reciprocal
accountability relations. All of us who see ourselves as possessing this status anticipate
that we are rightly able to call others to account even as we ourselves are rightly liable to
be called to account by others. The vulnerability in question is the potential for being
exposed to the insult and additional injury, when we perceive ourselves wronged, of
having our standing to call others to account denied, dismissed, or ignored in ways that
call our very status as full participants into question. Practices of accountability that
position individuals—and in social and political life, groups—in presumed reciprocal
relations of accountability are the scene of our moral vulnerability. To be vulnerable, in its
primary (and root) meaning, is to be “capable of being wounded.” In cases of moral
vulnerability, the wound to which we are vulnerable is dismissal or degradation of our
status as full participants in reciprocal accountability. Significant wrongs and wrongful
harms and losses test our vulnerability to being wounded in that way by supplying the
occasion for our attempts to hold others accountable.
All of us are vulnerable to this form of disregard—not only to being wronged but also to
finding our demands for morally appropriate responses by others to be without effect.
On my view, the concern and aim of reparative practices is not only to supply measures
to assuage or compensate for wrongful harm and loss but also, and in some cases
primarily, to address the moral vulnerabilities of victims by ensuring that they do not
suffer the indignity of dismissal. In cases in which reparations are at issue, victims of
grave and usually massive wrongs have typically suffered persistent denial and exclusion
from relations of reciprocal accountability, both in the event of wrongdoing and often in its
genesis and aftermath. In these cases, grave wrongs supply the occasion of reparative
justice and restitution or material compensation on some such occasions may be
necessary or uniquely effective as one part of reparations. I argue, however, that the
concern and aim of reparative practices is always also to recognize and address the past
and continuing moral vulnerabilities of victims of serious wrongs. It is only by addressing
the dignitary wounds and future threats of failures of reciprocal accountability that such
wrongs are truly redressed. It is only by understanding this dimension of reparative
justice that the different demands of different contexts of reparation are explained.
In Section 1, I give varied examples of the new practice of reparations to bring out the
complexity of reparations struggles and demands and to sharpen the question of what
this practice reveals about the guiding concern of reparative justice. In Section 2, I
explain how moral vulnerability inheres in accountability relations both in everyday life
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Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
and in the kinds of cases at which reparations aim and argue that attention to moral
vulnerability exposes a deeper unifying concern of reparative justice. In Section 3, I show
the role that moral vulnerability plays in shaping reparations demands and attempts, as
different kinds (p.113) and histories of accountability failures leave different wounds
and threats to be reckoned with as a matter of justice. In Section 4, I conclude with some
observations on the ways that monetary compensation—a measure so associated with
reparations that it can eclipse the larger aims and logic of reparative justice—plays its
role.

1. A New Practice of Reparations
The basic principle of reparations, affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2006 after a
decade of study, is that victims of gross violations of international human rights law or
serious violations of international humanitarian law should be provided with “full and
effective reparation.” Recognized modes of reparations include the following: restitution;
material compensation; rehabilitation through legal, medical, and social services;
guarantees of nonrepetition through institutional reform; and “satisfaction” (a category of
diverse measures that include truth-telling, exhuming human remains from atrocities,
public apology, commemoration, and educational activities) (United Nations, 2006).5 This
emergent political practice of reparations has been driven sometimes by legal actions and
decisions, sometimes by political movements, and sometimes by the interaction of both as
well as by contemporary movements for the recognition of historical injustices to
groups.6 In cases of systemic or mass violence and historical injustice, the legal model of
proportionate compensation for individual injury can seem inapt or inadequate on both
theoretical and practical grounds.7 In response, a recent generation of theoretical work
on reparations and reparative justice includes expressly moral and political conceptions in
which compensation is an instrument or part, never in itself sufficient and not always
necessary, of a larger set of measures meant to recognize victims of violence and
injustice, reaffirm their moral dignity, and create or reinstate their status as citizens
equal to others or recognition of their status as a people or nation (see de Greiff 2006;
Thompson 2002; Verdeja 2007; von Platz & Reidy 2006).
(p.114) Examples of the contemporary practice of reparations demands and reparations
programs are diverse. For many, the case of unjustly interned Japanese-American
citizens during World War II is illustrative of a meaningful and effective reparations effort.
During the war, Japanese-American citizens had been indiscriminately and forcibly
removed from their homes as a security risk and interned at bleak and distant camps,
suffering captivity, humiliation, and loss of property. They eventually achieved recognition
and reparation on behalf of the nation when the United States Congress conducted
extensive hearings with hundreds of witnesses to produce its official report, Personal
Justice Denied, finding that violation of Japanese-American citizens’ rights occurred due
to racism, war hysteria, and failed leadership. With the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
individual survivors received not only acknowledgment through the report but also a
symbolic monetary payment of $20, 000 (close to the amount suggested by advocacy
organizations), an individual letter of official apology from the president of the United
States, and pardon for convictions related to violating the internment and restoration of
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status and entitlements. Funds were also appropriated for research and public
educational activities related to the internment. Interned Japanese-American citizens saw
their internment publicly examined and repudiated, their rights as citizens and subjects
of justice reaffirmed, and their humiliation and suffering acknowledged through a variety
of symbolic measures.8
In another and very different kind of case, the long-running pursuit by the Lakota Sioux
people of return of the Black Hills by the United States has not been settled or repaired,
despite a 1980 United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Sioux Nation that
the 1877 statute that appropriated the Black Hills from the Lakota was an unconstitutional
taking of treaty-guaranteed lands, legally obligating the United States to pay just
compensation to contemporary Lakota people. The Sioux, however, refuse to this day to
accept the monetary award that was placed in trust, today standing at over USD$500
million, despite crushing rates of poverty, unemployment, incarceration, and ill health
among the Lakota and periodic efforts to effect a monetary settlement. The Lakota Sioux
insist on return of the Black Hills, which are central to their political and cultural identity.
Indian legal theorist Rebecca Tsosie explains that the tort model of compensating citizens
for past wrongs does not meet the claims of Indian people to cultural and political rights
as separate governments, including rights to protect their lands. Further, the settlement
of a property claim fails to touch “the moral and dignitary harms” suffered by the Sioux
as a people, such as the genocidal military campaign against them and purposeful attempts
to destroy their culture, of which the taking of their lands is one part (Tsosie 2007, p. 54;
see also Barkan 2003). Attempt to redress the Lakota (p.115) Sioux dispossession by
means of a monetary payment within the framework of property rights remains inscribed
within and reiterates the legal and cultural framework that not only displaced those of
Native nations through conquest but also devalued them and legitimated the destruction
of American Indian cultures with their own understandings of justice and of their status
as nations.
While the turn toward a new practice of reparations is commonly dated to West
Germany’s program of reparations to Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, other wellknown cases of extreme rights violations from the same era remain unresolved. The long
and tangled history of silence, denial, evasion, and compromised reparations attempts in
the case of women sexually enslaved in military brothels run by the Japanese Army in
World War II defies brief description. Although the enslavement, daily multiple rapes,
forced abortions, and other gross abuses of the women (unfortunately labeled comfort
women) was known at the conclusion of the war, the government of Japan did not make a
clear admission of its role until the Kono statement of 1993. Its reparative attempts
consisted of a trail of apologies from successive prime ministers of Japan and the creation
of the evasively named Asian Women’s Fund in 1995 to disburse monies to elderly
survivors. The fund, which terminated its operations in 2007, paid compensation (called
sympathy money) to 285 women, a fraction of existing survivors. Many survivors have
refused the offer because much of the money in the Asian Women’s Fund was raised by
private sources and none of the Japanese attempts at official apology have been judged
by the women to accept blame categorically on the part of the Japanese government. The
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situation has been worsened by continuing resistance or oscillation in statements by the
Japanese government regarding admission of wartime atrocities, including the
enslavement of the women, and by revisionist tendencies in Japanese textbooks
concerning sexual enslavement (and other slave labor).9
Many other cases might be discussed: precedent-setting German postwar reparations to
Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and to the new State of Israel; extensive reparations
programs to individual victims in several Latin American countries—Argentina, Chile,
Brazil—in the aftermath of repressive governments that practiced torture,
disappearance, and illegal detention against their own citizens; the continuing pursuit by
African Americans of redress for slavery or for Jim Crow legal discrimination and
segregation; monetary reparations to victims who testified before South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission; demands of African countries for reparations from
Europe for colonialism; direct reparations from individual (p.116) perpetrators to
victims of lesser crimes or property offenses through the innovative Community
Reconciliation Procedures implemented by Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception,
Truth and Reconciliation. While I cannot in this paper do justice to individual cases or
elaborate fully on differences among types of conflicts, between episodes of repression
and intergenerational histories of injustice, and between the reparations aimed at
individuals (even if targeted as members of groups) and reparations aimed at groups, I
offer these cases as a point of reference for my question concerning the fundamental
issue at stake in reparative justice. Can any significant unity be found in the guiding
concern of reparative justice that also helps to explain the different demands reparative
justice makes in different situations and the reasons victims have to entertain or to
reasonably reject reparative offers that involve both the transfer of money or goods and
other gestures of reparation?

2. Accountability Relations and Threats to Moral Standing
It is widely acknowledged that reparations cannot just consist in the tendering of goods
or money to those who have suffered grave wrongs and wrongful harms. Compensation
can be purely remedial and forward-looking, seeking to create fair distributions or
equality of opportunity without addressing effects of wrongful treatment or injustice.
Compensation can also be a charitable act impelled by compassion for loss and unjust
suffering that comes from those who accept no responsibility or bear no relationship to a
wrong. The very concept of reparations, however, seems deeply connected with issues
of wrongfulness and responsibility. Decades ago, Bernard Boxill (1972) made this point:
“Part of what is involved in rectifying an injustice is an acknowledgment on the part of the
transgressor that what he is doing is required of him because of his prior error….
Without the acknowledgment of error, the injurer implies that the injured has been
treated in a manner that befits him; he cannot feel that the injured party is his equal” (p.
118).10 Boxill’s insight draws attention to the importance of what the reparative
interaction reveals about the wrongdoer’s appreciation of the standing of the injured
party. As I will argue shortly, the original wrong is the occasion for an act of reparations,
but what is at stake in whether (adequate) reparations are offered is the recognition of a
certain kind of relationship and its implications. Nor does this recognition have to do only
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with the wronged party and the wrongdoer.
(p.117) To capture the widely shared sense that reparative justice and reparations
involve issues of wrong, responsibility, and just redress, I characterize clear cases of
reparations in this way: reparations consist in responsible parties’ intentionally giving
appropriate goods to victims of wrong as a specific act (or process) that expresses
acknowledgment of that wrong, responsibility for that wrong or its repair, and intent of
rendering just treatment deserved by a victim in virtue of that wrongful treatment. This
characterization tells only what kinds of acts or programs count indisputably as
reparations: they must directly communicate recognition of the reality and the nature of
wrongs, the insult and harm suffered by the victim in wrongful treatment, the victim’s
deservingness of repair as a matter of justice, and the responsibility of those offering
reparations to take up the demand of reparative justice.11 It is true that common usage
is more elastic than this definition allows. Sometimes the achievement of a legal judgment
or settlement is taken by victims, or is claimed by responsible parties, or is reported in
news media as “reparations” when responsibility is not clearly or expressly
communicated or even when it is formally denied. I do not seek to reform common
usage, but I believe that my explanation of reparations in terms of moral vulnerability
helps to illuminate why these extended uses can make sense in context or may be
strategically useful or symbolically hopeful, a point I return to briefly in conclusion.
If paradigmatic acts of reparations embody acknowledgment, responsibility, and an intent
to do justice, why are these aspects of central importance? What most fundamentally
does reparative justice concern, and to what must it respond? I suggest the key lies in
that form of relationship that is constitutive of any moral structure in actual life: relations
of accountability that connect individuals to others through recognition of responsibilities
under certain shared norms. The norms that structure accountability relations are norms
for acceptable conduct. Among these are norms for acceptable responses to
unacceptable conduct—conduct that has failed to observe mutually recognized norms.
Wrongs always in principle pose a set of questions and a set of potential threats to the
structure of accountability and to those who see themselves as parties to it. I call the
threat that serious wrongs pose moral vulnerability, that is, a particular kind of
vulnerability that arises from our participation in the practices of accountability. Moral
vulnerability involves exposure to a particular kind of wound that can be inflicted on any
of us who stands in, or aspires to stand in, reciprocal relations of accountability based in
mutually recognized standards.
To be a participant in practices of accountability, to borrow some language from P. F.
Strawson’s (1968) classic essay, is to be viewed as an apt target (pending excuse or
exemption) for demands for accountability by others in virtue of how we behave. But
Strawson reminded us that not all individuals are seen all (p.118) of the time as eligible
and competent participants and that to be a human actor who is not so seen is to be
viewed with an “objective attitude” by others who do so see themselves as full
participants. Strawson did not mean that within the objective attitude people are seen as
objects rather than human beings. He meant that human beings seen in that way fall

Page 7 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Marquette
University; date: 17 September 2014

Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
outside (wholly or in part) the form of relationship experienced by those who see
themselves and each other as eligible and competent. This relationship is one of
accountability: it consists in suffering the demands of others on us to render accounts of
our conduct and, where our conduct is unexcused, accepting responsibility and in turn
enjoying the standing to make similar claims upon others. When seen from the objective
attitude, one is an object to be controlled or managed, not a participant in reciprocal
accounting. The standing to hold and to be held to account is what makes one a
participant, and being able to hold others and being oneself held to account in particular
ways characterizes one’s relative position as a participant. To possess this standing is a
kind of recognition and empowerment, even if its consequences can be onerous.
The situation I call moral vulnerability is the possibility that one may fail to be recognized
as a participant, or as the kind of participant one believes one is entitled to be, in a
particularly direct way, by the refusal of one’s demands for accountability. One may also
find that the norms governing and constituting relations of accountability are in some
crucial respects not as one believes that they are or should be.12 Subordinates in a
workplace can discover that their objections to being treated thoughtlessly or rudely by
superiors receive no apology or even no reply. A sex worker can be met with skepticism
or ridicule in trying to press a complaint of assault or theft by a customer to authorities.
Victims of political violence may discover that their fellow citizens, even their neighbors,
find security in assuming that they must have done something that earned their
mistreatment. Not infrequently, others would rather not know. Ksenija Bilbija (2005)
quotes a high school student who disappeared for nine months during the military
dictatorship in Argentina: “‘Don’t tell us anything,’ her parents warned her when they
were all alone in the house” (p. 115). Not only wrongdoers but also communities can fail
to demand accountability or to stand with a victim of wrongdoing who demands it.
Reparative justice, I suggest, aims to maintain accountability relations by tending to our
moral vulnerability. It “does justice” by remediating wrongful loss and suffering that
should not have to be borne or absorbed by the victim, but even more fundamentally it
responds to our right and need to have (p.119) purchase on others’ due attention
when we suffer unacceptable treatment. Because wrongful harm and loss of material,
physical, psychological, and social sorts is so obviously the occasion of reparations, it can
obscure the presence and import of specifically moral vulnerability as the issue at its
core. Moral vulnerability is the potential for harm that inheres in the situation of one who
has suffered serious wrong in the context of those practices of accountability to which
one considers himself or herself a party. If the whole concern of reparations were
indemnification or making good for loss, it is unclear why reparations demand the
acknowledgment of wrong and responsibility to repair it as a matter of justice.
Acknowledgment and acceptance of responsibility confirm that the one wronged is
entitled to an accounting, and this may be of special importance for those who have
suffered persistent unacknowledged or unredressed wrongs.
Accountability is a relation: to be accountable is to be accountable to someone in the
matter of one’s conduct. The most minimal sense of accountability is answerability, to be
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in circumstances where one is obliged to inform others concerning one’s conduct and
activity. More specifically, one must answer with explanations or justifications that are
responsive to others’ legitimate interests and expectations in regard to that behavior. To
be answerable submits one at the least to judgments of the acceptability or
unacceptability of one’s conduct. Another meaning of accountability is liability to sanction,
that is, exposure to penalty or punishment for behavior that fails, without excuse or
justification, to satisfy a requirement or normative expectation, an expectation about how
others should or must behave, based on law, morality, agreement, or common
understandings. Behavior that violates standards or norms creates a warrant for inflicting
disapproval or reproof and enforcing some demand on the violator in the forms of
punishment, penalty, or amends.
Both forms of accountability—answerability and liability to sanction—adhere to authority
relations, usually asymmetrically: employees are accountable to bosses, subordinates to
superiors, children to supervising adults, where the authority has standing both to
demand accounts and to take remedial or punitive action. Common morality, however,
supposes that competent agents are answerable to and may in turn demand accountings
from at least some (if not all) others with respect to some matters. The accountability
constitutive of common morality reveals itself especially in the case of behavior that
appears to violate widely recognized moral norms, where people are likely to be pressed
to explain themselves or admit fault, whether or not any sanction beyond disapproval or
reproach can be applied. In the optimal case, the offending party is called to answer
(whether voluntarily or under some compulsion) and, lacking excuse or justification, to
accept liability at least to negative judgment and potentially to demands for remedial
action (at a minimum, an apology), even if the required response cannot be commanded
or compelled. Offended parties and others who share in commonly accepted standards,
then, are in a (p.120) position to demand accounts for apparently unacceptable or faulty
behavior, and offending parties are required to give accounts and to recognize the
legitimacy of negative judgments and to respond to their consequences.
If this is what accountability means in its most elementary form—answerability that opens
at least the possibility of negative assessment and its potentially demanding consequences
—there are vulnerabilities on both (or all) sides when wrong has been done. The
apparent wrongdoer is vulnerable to misplaced demands for accounting or to
attributions of fault or responsibility that might be unreasonable or unfair. In discussions
of reparations for historical injustices, atrocities, or systemic violence, the cogency or
fairness of placing responsibility on particular parties is often discussed: whether
currently living people can bear responsibilities of reparation for injustices committed
long before they existed or for their eventual effects; whether being under others’
authority or being influenced by intense situational pressures constitute excusing
circumstances; or whether some are unfairly scapegoated if they are held responsible
when some others who behaved similarly are not.
I intend here, however, to examine the moral vulnerability, the exposure to a moral
wound, of the seriously wronged individual. The potential wound of one wronged is to be
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ignored or repudiated in, or erased or excluded from, one’s standing to demand an
account from another for conduct one believes is a serious wrong or the source of
wrongful harm to oneself. For the apparent wrongdoer, freedom from accounting to the
wronged party or to others is moral invulnerability, the most profound form of impunity
—not merely freedom from punishment or other sanction but also exemption from the
most basic kind of accountability, the obligation to answer for one’s conduct to some (or
all) others. For the victim, the inability effectively to command accounts from others for
apparent wrongdoing raises a question—and sometimes an alarm—concerning the
victim’s participant status in relations of accountability. In both terms of the accountability
relation in any context, there are possibilities of dignity and degradation for those who call
for an accounting and those who are called to it. Since my concern here is with the moral
vulnerability of the victim of serious wrong, I examine the structure of the victim’s
situation.
Suppose X is the apparent agent of wrongful hurt, harm, or loss. Then X stands liable to
accounting, assessment, and pressures for sanction or reparation. The apparent victim
should be able to demand an account of X, to confront X with a negative assessment, and
possibly to demand satisfaction from X and the support of others in seeking satisfaction
(through informal or formal reproach, punishment, or amends) from X. The “ability” to do
these things refers to a standing within relations of accountability that must be
recognized by others, not to a physical or psychological capability. So the victim’s
specifically moral vulnerability concerns whether the victim does enjoy that standing. The
victim is morally vulnerable to finding that others, including (p.121) but not only the
perpetrator of wrongful harm, in some way fail to respond in ways that affirm that
standing. Others might not see what the victim has suffered as wrong because they
blame the victim or do not believe him. They might not recognize that the victim is entitled
to call the offender to account, perhaps because the victim is negligible or despised or
the offender is powerful or esteemed. Others might not recognize the victim as
protected by the norms that support the victim’s negative assessment of the offender, as
if standards of common courtesy, decency, or justice apply only among people in some
social places and the victim is not among them. They might not recognize or support the
victim’s demands on the offender or others for satisfaction or redress as legitimate or
compelling; they might think that this is, after all, the lot of a woman, a servant, or a
person of lower caste. The wronged party who believes that he or she enjoys reciprocal
accountability relations with the presumed wrongdoer, or at least enjoys this standing in
the domain of interactions at issue, is exposed to the moral wound of being disqualified,
degraded, or excluded from fully reciprocal accountability relations, at least in the
instance at issue. A statement rejecting “overly critical” history textbooks, attributed to
the Japanese Ministry of Education in the 1950s, for example, reveals an entirely common
attitude by no means specific to Japan: “The violation of women is something that has
happened on every battlefield in every era of human history. This is not an issue that
needs to be taken up with respect to the Japanese Army in particular” (Lind 2008, pp. 35–
36).13 Indeed, accountability for sexual violations of women in conflict was not firmly
established in international law until the past two decades; the disputed reparation for
comfort women described earlier emerged in this recent climate.
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Of course, a self-described victim may be simply mistaken or out of bounds in claiming
wrongs, assigning responsibility, or putting demands. Yet accountability practices are
dynamic; they are a medium in which obligations, values, and accountability relations are
affirmed or denied, contested or negotiated. For this reason the patterns embodied in
practices of accountability are important for asserting or testing one’s participant status.
One way to assert an existing or proposed boundary within relations of accountability is
to refuse to account for behavior to persons who are not, in one’s view or by the
standards one believes prevail, entitled to demand accounts. You may not have any
standing to monitor my financial or familial or sexual affairs, and if you presume upon me
for accounts I will justifiably refuse to give them. It is also true that our social and moral
worlds are segmented by specialized accountability relations: the truth owed a friend is
not necessarily owed a stranger, and my employer may impose a pay reduction in penalty
for my unauthorized early departures when my irritated coworkers may not.
(p.122) In speaking of reparations, however, we are typically speaking of very grave
wrongs and harms to human beings. We are speaking of wrongs such as assaults to
physical, psychological, and social well-being; denial of rights; subjection to inhumane or
humiliating treatment or deprivation; or significant destruction or alienation of property,
livelihood, or heritage. With respect to these profound insults to well-being and dignity,
human beings will usually feel themselves grossly ill-treated, even if their social or legal
positions institutionalize their diminishment in, or exclusion from, fully reciprocal
accountability. If they cry out against injustice anyway, and in the case of oppressed
groups some invariably do, they bid for some or for greater recognition that something is
owed to them for a real wrong and the harms it inflicts. In doing so, they assert a
participant role in accountability relations that is uncertain or that has been denied to
them.
Those who experience what they take to be gross injustice yearn for, and where possible
seek, some validation from others that their sense of their experience is true. Most
simply, moral validation, from the perpetrator of a wrong or from others, consists in
those others’ affirmation with the victim that the wrong is real and its wrongfulness is
clear, that someone else bears responsibility, and that others owe an accounting and may
be liable to sanction or for redress. At its most effective, moral validation is a social
process in which convergent judgments about grave wrongs within a community or
society assure the victims of wrong (and anyone else who may be uncertain or resistant)
that norms are shared and that the victims are recognized and valued members of a
community prepared to respond to the mistreatment the victim has suffered with
appropriate and justified demands for accountability on those who have done wrong.14
This is why it is always a standing obligation of communities to respond to claims of
serious wrongdoing with respectful attention and to respond to evidence of serious
wrongdoing with an affirmation of the standards violated and a confirmation that the
injury of the victim is real and is a matter for redress. Moral validation might not be
forthcoming from wrongdoers themselves; indeed, in large-scale violence offenses are
typically minimized, justified, and simply denied by those with responsibility. Nor do
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victims always value or respect an affirmation of standards from individual wrongdoers;
victims might find the affirmation of wrongdoers incredible or irrelevant. In any case
wrongdoers are in a position to affirm (belatedly) only their own recognition of the
authority of violated moral standards. Wrongdoers are not necessarily in a position to
affirm either that standards are authoritative for a community or that the victim is within
the community’s protective concern. There is always a communal responsibility in moral
validation that alone can fully meet the (p.123) threat of moral vulnerability. The
commission charged to study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 affirmed the necessity of official
governmental validation in some cases: “There is no way but by government to
represent the collective, and there is no way but by reparations to make real the
responsibility” (Cose 2004, p. 151).15 The government of Oklahoma, however, declined
that responsibility on behalf of its community.
Where moral validation desired or sought by victims of apparently serious wrongs is not
forthcoming from wrongdoers or the relevant community, what does it mean? It might
mean that the facts or seriousness of the violation are in doubt or uncertain in the eyes of
others. It might mean that the moral standards that define wrongs in the victim’s eyes are
questioned or rejected by others. It might mean that the facts concerning responsibility
are uncertain (e.g., that the victim is, in whole or in part, to blame) or that standards of
responsibility are unclear or contested in the kind of case at issue. If moral validation is
not forthcoming, at least the judgment of the victim concerning wrong and responsibility
is in question; the victim’s standing to enter claims to accountability may or may not be
directly impugned.
Challenges to the victim’s perception of wrong and responsibility in some cases, however,
indicate a kind of discrediting or disqualification of the victim’s standing to make a
judgment that embodies the authority of group norms, and this in turn can mean that the
victim is perceived as somehow not a “normal” or “representative” or “authoritative”
judge who embodies the community’s point of view. A victim’s attempt to enter
accountability claims may also be blocked if the victim is not seen as protected by
standards that protect others, or at least not at the hands of the perpetrator in question.
It may also be that the alleged wrongdoer is not viewed as subject to the standards
invoked, or at least not in the case of the victim in question. In such cases, the victim does
not possess socially recognized authority to press accountability upon the supposed
wrongdoer. When those who see themselves as seriously or grossly wronged fail to
receive validation, it may not be clear which of these situations obtains, but social
hierarchies and de facto relations of very unequal power or social authority often result
in systematic accountability differentials or asymmetries.
It is because the victim’s standing to require accountability can be in question that
acknowledgment of wrong and responsibility is crucial in constituting reparations. It is the
clarity and adequacy of that acknowledgment that resolves the question in favor of the
victim’s standing as a full participant with others under shared moral standards and one
whose sound claims concerning (p.124) wrong and redress require respectful
attention. When this acknowledgment and responsiveness is refused (or confused), the
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potential for moral diminishment, erasure, exclusion, or abandonment by whatever
community the victim appeals to for validation is realized. The victim is morally vulnerable
to the response: “You are in no position to make demands on us.” That is to say, the
victim’s standing as a participant in reciprocal practices of accountability is either
unrecognized or denied, at least with respect to some wrongs the victim experiences as
urgent and damaging. This refusal of accountability is common enough when wrongdoers
continue to enjoy social power and prestige. While this might enrage victims, it is not as
consequential as a community’s failure or refusal to lend its authority to victims seeking
recognition of wrongs.

3. Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
Once moral vulnerability is recognized as the underlying issue in redressing wrongs, and
once the multiple facets of the standing to demand accountability are exposed more
precise sense can be made of what is at stake in redress. Differences in what reparations
concretely demand will track the contours of the kind and extent of moral vulnerability
that is at issue or the nature and depth of the actual wound of moral diminishment,
exclusion, erasure, or abandonment that individuals and groups have endured in
addition to their wrongful injuries and losses.
Reparation in all cases is in some ways necessarily backward looking: It works on
assessing and relieving the threat of moral vulnerability that inheres in the wrong already
done and the history of the situation and relationships involved. In cases where the
victim’s standing has been questioned or denied, reparations work at closing and healing
the wound of erasure, exclusion, or abandonment that is opened up by a failure of
validating responses to the wrong. Cases that call for reparation, however, vary greatly in
the defining dimension of moral vulnerability. If there is no salient or serious threat to the
victim’s standing in an instance of wrongdoing, a simple apology or a straightforward
compensatory transaction can rectify a breach in conduct that does not reveal a gap in
accountability and the mutual recognition it signifies. If there is an accountability gap,
however, the nature of the gap matters and may itself become the site of other
challenges, threats, and fresh wounds. In disputes about fact or history, parties may see
each other as merely mistaken, or some parties may arrogate solely to themselves the
authority to define the situation. If moral values or standards of responsibility are applied
in disparate ways by victims and those they would hold to account, it matters whether
this is a disagreement among equals or whether there is evidence that some parties
refuse to apply values and principles to certain individuals or groups. In cases of
historical injustice, individuals or groups bring forward offenses (p.125) and damages
previously denied or rationalized with reparative demands that encompass a history of
exclusion, subjection, violence, stigma, or exploitation and in some instances previous
rebuffs to earlier demands. In every case, reparations will have different hurdles to
clear, and different kinds of communicative and reconstructive work will be possible and
necessary between the parties.
Reparations also have forward-looking aims. Discussions of reparations that emphasize
the element of acknowledgment often speak of the aim of reparations as achieving
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respectful relations, restoring trust, or establishing the victim’s equality. Yet even if these
goals—to establish respect, trust, or equality—are the ultimate or regulative ideals of
reparative practice, more immediate questions about inclusion and recognition in
mutually understood accountability relations are at stake in reparations struggles. For
two reasons, it is unwise and implausible to burden reparations efforts with too much
responsibility for good future relations. First, to do so diverts attention from what I am
arguing is the primary locus of actual reparations attempts or struggles—a negotiation of
accountability in and of the present in light of a sorry past. Second, to do so is to conflate
reparations efforts and fulfilling demands of reparative justice with the achievement of
substantial reconciliation. These two issues are linked.
First, when reparations are made, they call the parties to the reparations process to a
shared attempt at convergent judgments of wrong and responsibility and to jointly
meaningful action that responds both to the wrongful harms done and to whatever
threats of moral vulnerability are revealed. The scene of this attempt at renegotiating
accountability relations is the here and now. An interesting fact about actual reparations
movements, proposals, and programs is the degree to which the problems and concerns
to be faced are often, perhaps typically, only fully revealed in the event of demands,
rebuffs, proposals, debates, negotiations, and agreements. I believe this is explained by
the fact that moral vulnerabilities are multiple, complicated, and not always clearly visible
to the parties. They are likely to express themselves most clearly in the very event in
which reparations are offered or sought, as this process exposes disjoint perceptions of
wrong, responsibility, and obligation. Even to arrive at a determination of what is wrong
about what happened in the past and who is responsible for it or its repair—no small feat
in many cases—does not necessarily reveal all aspects of moral vulnerability or the extent
to which its threat of moral erasure or abandonment has been realized. This is a
substantial part of the work of reparations in the present.
Those who suffer moral vulnerability as victims may feel it acutely. They may be infuriated
by the questions raised about their understanding of the facts and wrongs of the matter
and outraged by the fact that those to whom they assign responsibility often have the
power—socially, institutionally, and politically—to also appoint themselves arbiters of the
validity of responsibility (p.126) claims. They may be frustrated by the degree to which
their claims are met with confident or casual rejection or are deemed false, incredible, or
exaggerated. Pierre Hazan (2010), writing of the fractious 2001 World Conference
Against Racism in Durban, describes a European diplomat as saying that African claims for
compensation for colonialism and slavery were “unreasonable, bordering on psychotic”
(p. 86), while Rosa Amelia Plumelle-Uribe, an Afro-Columbian writer, says of the
Europeans, “They procrastinate and assume a right that defeated Germany itself never
dared claim, that of defining their crimes, and, in place of their victims, to decide what
historic weight to give or not give to these events” (p. 70). It is true that those seeking
reparations might be mistaken in these feelings and the perceptions that ground them.
But it is also possible that they might be experiencing precisely an asymmetry in relations
of accountability that shifts the burden of proof and justification to them, even as it seems
to tilt the balance of respect and credibility away from them. Issues of moral vulnerability
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are diffuse and abstract relative to the harms victims grieve and for which they seek
repair; these harms can include lost years of wrongful imprisonment or the deprivation of
professional work, ravages of torture, the disappearance of a child, or the dispossession
and decimation or the enslavement and subjugation a people. It is obvious in many cases
that what has been lost can never be returned or compensated. No one knows this
better than the victims. The struggle for reparations is nonetheless crucial to see whose
claims will be acknowledged and whose responsibility will be established. Without
understanding moral vulnerability, one does not understand what is at stake in
reparations attempts and why they proceed as they do.
Often reparations (or reparations demands) come in waves, or in fits and starts, as partial
acknowledgment, rebuffs, offers, shifts in perspective, and historical and political
developments unfold within or around the struggle or negotiation for reparations. This is
most so in reparations for structural injustices or mass violence in the national or
international political arena. Reparations, I suggest, are really about a present moment
(although sometimes a protracted one) in which those held responsible for reparation and
those seeking it, and possibly others, argue over acceptable interpretations of the past
they can share and try to negotiate an interaction in the present that models fair terms of
reciprocal recognition and accountability. The moment that a discussion concerning
reparations commences is a moment of considerable uncertainty for all parties to the
interaction. Those who had confidently ignored or denied others’ claims of injustice and
injury are responding newly both to the claims and to a new standing for the claimants.
Those putting claims are beginning to exercise powers and might experience leverage
and opportunity long denied them. This means that things are already not what they
were, but are not yet what they need to become. One might characterize the sense of
relationship among the (p.127) parties as the possibility of reparations dawns and
momentum for reparations builds as a midway (if not a mid-air) position, in terms of
accountability. Reparations are about where the parties can get to in the present in an
attempt to transform their relative positions in the past. A reparations effort might best be
seen as a bridge from a past not just of unrepaired harms but also of accountability
denied to a present of reciprocal accountability acknowledged. Seeing it this way brings
into focus the intricacy of the threats, wounds, tentative steps, and difficult new
understandings that are characteristic of the reparative process.
This leads me to the second point: It is unrealistic to expect from reparations measures
too much and implausible to explain the function and aims of discrete gestures or
programs of reparations too largely in terms of distant future relations. It is true, ideally,
that the establishment of fair terms of accountability and shared recognition of the moral
standards they predicate should forecast better future relations. It is certainly true that
successful reparations are in part successful if and because they render parties to the
interaction hopeful about future relations. A measure of success is whether the parties
are moved to try to fulfill the promise for a possible future that reparations token.
Successful reparations ignite hope; hope involves energized attention, imagination,
alertness to possible routes to the goal, and the resilience to keep looking for and trying
them.16 But reparations given are best understood as a marker of present achievement
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in the history of relations among people or among peoples, an achievement measured by
its distance from the past scene of wrongdoing.
With respect to the future, reparations can only at best set an example and make a
promise or commitment based on what is achieved in the present instance. The idea that
they actually achieve trusting, respectful, and compassionate relations asks too much,
especially in the aftermath of gross and massive violence or intergenerational injustice.
That they give reason and create motivation to seek out possibilities for building trusting,
respectful, and compassionate relations is a more fitting goal. As the wrongs of the past
set terms for reasonable fear, disillusionment, hatred, or cynicism, the present at best
can give reasons for hope by creating a sense of what is possible. Hope in turn creates
motivation to build the relations that the reparative interaction at its finest exemplifies and
models. I do not think it wise to claim that it builds those relations; it supplies a model and
ideally kindles receptiveness and motivation, for that construction project over time and
under tests. This underscores the important point that reparations do not “close books”
in many cases; they instead get parties on the same page concerning accountability going
forward.

(p.128) 4. Conclusion
I have argued that we can make sense of significant differences in a large range of
reparations contexts by viewing the core issue of reparations as the negotiation by
parties of mutually acceptable standings in accountability relations governed by shared
norms. Not to enjoy such a standing is not only to be open to disregard, attack, or abuse
but also to lack an effective claim upon those responsible to give accounts and to take
responsibility for wrongful harms one has endured. Yet it would not be right, either, to
say that reparations are “not really about the money.” Money or other material transfers
are often very much at issue. It is better to say that sometimes it is crucially about
material restitution or compensation but is not so in every case and that, even where
compensation is in order, the reparative momentum depends on what the money or
goods mean. Restitution or compensation is reparative when, in context and accompanied
by other gestures, it can sustain the necessary messages of acknowledgment that affirm
reciprocal accountability under shared standards. The emotional blight and material
losses of the internment is not erased for Japanese-Americans unjustly interned, but they
received unambiguous validation and multiple gestures of repair as citizens from their
nation’s highest representative body. For the Lakota Sioux, the settlement of a property
claim by a money payment effaces their understanding of the nature and gravity of the
wrong done to them and bypasses the crucial issue of relations among sovereign entities
upon which their treaty commitments with the United States were premised. Those
women sexually enslaved in Japanese Army brothels who accepted payments from the
Asian Women’s Fund might or might not have found the context and message of the
money reparative; some might have found it so, while others reasonably judged that they
were unlikely to get anything more or better. The women who publicly rejected the
payments made clear that they continued to find the Japanese government shielding itself
from full accountability to them. Money alone does not avail as reparations.
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With states, however, money is clearly one powerful and objective medium in which
accountability may be pursued and demonstrated. Yet even when it is, acknowledgment
of wrong and responsibility, the embodiment of accountability, is often paramount as a
goal and a driving force for victims. Countries such as Germany, Argentina, and Chile
have conducted substantial monetary reparations programs, but they took shape in
stages, enlarging the numbers of victims and the nature of violations compensated, in an
expanding universe of accountability reshaped over time by legal and political
developments concerning accountability of states to victims of human rights abuses.17 It
is not surprising that reparations demands entail and respond to shifts in legal and
(p.129) political status and standards of accountability, for law and politics embody
moral standing in public and enforceable ways.
It is also not surprising that cases where money is won, through litigation or negotiation,
are sometimes called reparations even if unambiguous acknowledgment of wrong,
responsibility, or an obligation of justice is missing. Victims who pursue legal redress
might consider a monetary or restitution settlement a kind of reparations because they
believe that the settlement in fact concedes or implies wrong and responsibility publicly
whether or not it is admitted. Victims or others may, approvingly or disapprovingly, view
monetary payments and other forms of recognition as reparations even when they are
not so called by those who bestow them. In 1994, the Florida legislature awarded
compensation to survivors of a white riot that burned the African American town of
Rosewood, Florida, to the ground in 1923. The State of Florida acknowledged that it
failed to prevent the unlawful destruction and provided compensation payments, a
scholarship fund, and other efforts. It did not apologize or refer to its compensation as
reparations, but it was “the first time that any American governmental body had
acknowledged its responsibility for an act of racial violence committed against African
Americans, in the long history of such acts” (Nunn 1999, p. 435).18 In historical context,
against a backdrop of denial and silence about many such events, seeing this response as
reparations claims a kind of victory. In another case, the Japanese government refused to
call the payments it agreed to in connection with its colonization of Korea reparations but
agreed to let Korea inform its public that Japan had paid reparations, allowing the meaning
of the interaction to play differently for different audiences (Lind 2008, pp. 47–48). It is
true that the potential for future disillusionment or betrayal looms in cases in which full
acknowledgment of responsibility, precise appreciation of wrong, or acceptance of an
obligation of reparative justice is lacking, hedged, or ambiguous. Future behavior, or
continuing or future denial of wrongdoers or responsible communities, can reopen
wounds, nullifying hopeful reparative interpretations. But this can also happen in cases
that fully meet the standard of acknowledgment, responsibility, and intent to do justice.
Reparations can only ever be an act or process at one time; the reciprocal accountability
they token must be secured and shown real over time.
I have argued that a kind of moral vulnerability inheres in accountability relations. Victims
of wrongs are vulnerable to the additional moral insult and injury of being denied the
standing of full partners in reciprocal relations of accountability by those they would hold
to account. The potential for or the (p.130) reality of additional insult and injury in the
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aftermath of wrongs provides a unifying view of the task of reparations. Reparations must
address not only the harm and loss caused by the original wrong but also the nature and
extent of the moral vulnerability exposed by the wrong or realized by the absence of
redress. The role of moral vulnerability in the past and the present explains why different
reparations contexts require very different responses.
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Notes:
(1) See Braithwaite (2002, pp. 3–27) on the widespread use of reparative practices across
cultures.
(2) I will call this kind of justice reparative justice, choosing the broadest and most
intuitive label although even the terminology remains unsettled. The kind of justice that
requires redress of wrongs and wrongful harms and losses is variously called corrective,
commutative, compensatory, rectificatory, reparatory, reparative, and now also
sometimes restorative justice. These labels have different connections and connotations,
however, and there is no universally shared view about whether they refer to the same
concept of justice or about what are the paradigmatic cases or defining characteristics of
justice of that kind.
(3) Philosophical arguments for one or another principle of individualized and ideally
proportionate compensation include Nozick (1974, pp. 57–58), MacCormick (1977),
Nickel (1976), Coleman (1994), Wenar (2006), and Winter (2006).
(4) The point of this shift is widely agreed to be the unprecedented program of massive
reparations by the Federal Republic of Germany to individual victims of the Holocaust.
On this dramatic historical shift, see Colonomos and Armstrong (2006, p. 391), who call it
a “model of an entirely new kind of reparations.” See also Falk (2000), Teitel (2000, pp.
119–128), Torpey (2003, pp. 4–5), and Barkan (2003, pp. 95–98). On the jurisprudence of
the Inter-american Court of Human Rights, see Carrillo (2006). Falk stresses how large
and significant a shift in international law is involved in the developing concept of state
responsibility. I do not here defend state responsibility for reparations, although I believe
it is defensible and is, in any case, the existing standard.
(5) The conditions and nature of group claims are an area in need of much more
examination. The Basic Principles in its preamble notes that victimization may “also be
directed against groups of persons who are targeted collectively” and, in Article V, that
“victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm.” On some ambiguity
in the idea of collective reparations, see Rubio-Marin (2009, especially pp. 385–387).
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(6) On the interaction of legal claims and settlements and legislative actions in some
reparations contexts, see Guembe (2006) and Lira (2006).
(7) See de Greiff (2006) on the need for a political, rather than legal/juridical, conception
of reparations. See also Brooks (2004), rejecting a tort model of reparations to African
Americans; see Roht-Arriaza (2004) on the relevance of collective and symbolic
reparations for communities. I contrast a juridical with a restorative justice framework in
Walker (2006b).
(8) Brooks (1999) contains source materials on Japanese-American internment and
redress. The case is discussed by Minow (1998) and Yamamoto and Ebesugawa (2006).
(9) Much of the tangled history is summarized in Iida (2004). Some recent developments
are reported in Onishi (2007a, 2007b) and Fackler and Sang-Hun (2007). Lind (2008)
closely studies the backdrop of struggles with and within Japan over responsibility for
wartime atrocities, including the enslavement of women in brothels. Hamber and Palmary
(2009) offer a detailed consideration of the apologies. A Congressional Research Service
Memorandum by Niksch (n.d.), an Asian specialist, is a useful compendium of information
up to 2007.
(10) For parallel distinctions emphasizing this specifically reparative dimension that
transcends compensation, see Roberts (2002), Satz (2007), Thompson (2002), and von
Platz and Reidy (2006). Gaus (2002) argues that compensation cannot restore moral
equality. Bernstein (2009) stresses that the award of damages not only serves to
indemnify the victim for losses but also allows the victim to pursue security and freedom
through recognition of the victim’s rights; compensation is necessary but not sufficient
for reparations.
(11) I study in detail the communicative structure and what I call the expressive burden
of reparations in Walker (2013).
(12) I introduce here the barest bones of the practice of accountability. Some discussions
of accountability relations and the effects of context and power differences on the ground
are Harvey (1999) and Walker (2007). Smiley (1992) offers a pragmatic theory of
responsibility that exposes the evaluative judgments involved in all responsibility
assessments, affecting for what and to whom one is accountable. On a positional and
relational view of accountability, see Kutz (2000).
(13) On recent recognition of sexual violence in international law, see Askin (2003),
Duggan and Jacobson (2009), and United Nations General Assembly (1998, articles 7 and
8).
(14) My broader account of victims’ needs for voice, validation, and vindication is found
in Walker (2006a).
(15) The community that is relevant in affirming standards is context dependent. For
human rights violations, the international community may be the relevant authority. See
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Addis (2003) on how the international community is constituted in the process of invoking
international norms and applying sanctions.
(16) A fuller discussion of hope and repair is found in Walker (2006a, 2010).
(17) On German reparations, see Colonomos and Armstrong (2006). On Argentina, see
Guembe (2006), and on Chile, see Lira (2006).
(18) See also Cose (2004, pp. 154–156), who contrasts this case with that of the Tulsa
Race Riot of 1921. Destruction of the African American community of Greenwood,
Oklahoma, and the massacre of between 75 and 300 people was documented by a special
commission in 2001, but no compensation or other measures of official recognition have
been forthcoming.
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